RESEARCH
My research primarily focuses on managerial topics including creative incentive contracting, human capital management and labor economics, and resource allocation decisions. I mostly leverage experimental economics techniques in both the lab and field to test my research questions, but am trained in archival and analytical methods.
Working Papers
1. “Layoff or Furlough? Effects of the Performance Measurement System on Labor Cost Reduction Decisions” with Eric Chan and Brian White
Status: Revise & Resubmit at The Accounting Review
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​Presentations: University of Texas at Austin (Feinberg); Tulane University (White); University of Kentucky (White); 2023 ABO Conference (Feinberg); 2024 MAS Midyear Meeting (Feinberg)
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​Recognition: Selected as one of three “Picks of the 2023 ABO Coordinators” presentations
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​Abstract: To cut costs, firms must often choose between laying off certain employees or broadly implementing furloughs. Using an interactive experiment, we investigate how the precision of a firm's performance measurement system (PMS) influences managers’ labor cost reduction decisions and employees’ reactions to this decision. First, contrary to economics-based predictions, overall workforce performance strongly influences managers' decisions. Under a precise PMS, managers more often choose furloughs when overall performance has been strong, even when low performers are identifiable. However, layoffs are more common when overall performance is weak. Under an imprecise PMS, managers rely less on workforce performance information. Second, employees react differently depending on manager’s decision and the PMS type. After layoffs, retained employees reciprocate more under an imprecise PMS, which aligns with reference-dependent reciprocity theory but is inconsistent with fairness perceptions. Employee performance after furloughs remains consistent across both precise and imprecise PMS. (Available on SSRN​)
2. “When is it Fairer to Allocate Resources for Training to Lower-Performing versus Higher-Performing Employees?” with Eric Chan and Martin Wiernsperger
Status: Revise & Resubmit at Journal of Accounting Research
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​Presentations: 2024 ERMAC Conference at WU Vienna (Wiernsperger); Cornell University (Wiernsperger); 2024 ABO Conference (Feinberg); 2024 EIASM Conference at Bocconi University (Wiernsperger); 2025 MAS Midyear Meeting (Feinberg); Labor Economics & Accounting Conference at Stanford University (Wiernsperger)
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​​Abstract: Professional development and training are essential for organizational growth and success, but resource constraints often force managers into a dilemma: should they train their lower-performing or higher-performing employees? While lower performers with greater skill gaps can benefit more from training than higher performers, managers must also consider employees’ fairness concerns. Using an interactive experiment, we predict and find that how employees react to their manager’s allocation of training resources depends on the prevailing fairness norms in the work environment. When egalitarian norms dominate, such as when employees have little control over their job tasks, lower performers take the receipt of resources for training for granted and react negatively when the manager allocates those resources to higher performers instead. In contrast, when meritocratic norms dominate, such as when employees have more control over their job tasks, higher performers react more negatively than lower performers when not receiving resources for training. (Available on SSRN)
3.“It’s Not All Fun and Games: The Effects of Gamification on Employee Adaptivity” with Eric Chan (based on 2nd year summer paper)
Status: Revise & Resubmit at The Accounting Review
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​Presentations: University of Texas at Austin (Feinberg); Texas State University (Chan); Brigham Young University (Chan), 2024 ABO Conference (Feinberg); 2025 MAS Midyear Meeting (Feinberg)
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​Recognition: ABO 2024 Emerging Scholar Manuscript Award
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​Abstract: Firms are increasingly using non-monetary gamification (points, badges, levels) to motivate employee performance, but its impact on employee adaptivity is unexplored. This study examines the effects of gamification on employees' 1) performance in an initial task, 2) willingness to switch tasks, and 3) performance in a new task, while considering the moderating effects of employees’ innate challenge-seeking traits. Experimental results show that gamification boosts initial performance by encouraging employees to work longer hours. However, gamification reduces the willingness to switch tasks, particularly for challenge-seeking employees, despite the potential for higher pay. After switching tasks, challenge-seeking employees remain motivated by gamification, but not challenge-avoidant employees. Results from a supplemental experiment support our theory that gamification hurts employee adaptivity due to an increase in task embeddedness. Overall, these findings suggest that, notwithstanding the initial performance benefits, gamification has potential negative effects on employee adaptivity that vary based on individual traits. (Available on SSRN)
Works in Progress
4. “Prosocial Incentive Tournaments: Evidence from the Lab and Field” solo-authored
Status: Ongoing data collection and analysis with collaborating firm
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5. “Interpretive Guidance” with Kaitlyn Kroeger
Status: Instrument design and proposal refinement​​