RESEARCH
My research primarily focuses on managerial topics including creative incentive contracting, human capital management, micro labor economics, and resource allocation decisions. I mostly leverage experimental economics techniques in the lab or conduct field experiments to test my research questions, but am trained in and open to using alternative methods (archival, analytical).
Job Market Paper
1. “Intermittent Prosocial Reward Tournaments: A Field and Lab Investigation” solo-authored
Status: Revising manuscript
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​Presentations: AAA/Deloitte/J. Michael Cook Doctoral Consortium (Westlake); The University of Texas at Austin
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​Abstract: Firms frequently use tournament contracts to incentivize employee performance. One increasingly popular approach is intermittent tournaments—short-term, incentive-based competitions interspersed with intentional breaks. However, intermittent incentives create periods without rewards, which can reduce employee motivation. This study investigates whether prosocial rewards, incentives that benefit others, can mitigate this demotivation more effectively than monetary rewards once tournaments conclude. Using a field experiment with a large regional bank and two laboratory experiments, I find that while monetary rewards more strongly increase performance during the tournament phase, prosocial rewards are more effective at sustaining performance after incentives are removed. These results are consistent with theoretical predictions: competition amplifies extrinsic motivation linked to monetary incentives during tournaments, whereas prosocial rewards foster lasting motivation after tournaments, particularly among non-winners. This research offers important insights for incentive design. Specifically, it suggests that prosocial rewards can help maintain long-term employee motivation, while monetary rewards may be more suitable for maximizing short-term output, when intermittent tournaments are used. Moreover, these findings point to a tournament structure that can reduce classic pitfalls of tournament theory, such as “giving up” by non-winners.
Working Papers
2. “Layoffs or Reduced Hours? The Joint Effects of Workforce Performance and Performance Measurement Precision” with Eric Chan and Brian White
Status: Revise & Resubmit at The Accounting Review
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​Presentations: The University of Texas at Austin (Feinberg); Tulane University (White); University of Kentucky (White); 2023 ABO Conference (Feinberg); 2024 MAS Midyear Meeting (Feinberg)
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​Recognition: Selected as one of three “Picks of the 2023 ABO Coordinators” presentations
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​Abstract: To cut costs, firms must often choose between laying off relatively few employees or reducing the work hours and pay of more employees. Using an interactive experiment, we investigate how overall workforce performance and the precision of the performance measurement system (PMS) jointly affect managers’ labor cost reduction decisions. Further, we examine employees’ subsequent reactions and performance to managers’ decisions. Contrary to economics-based predictions, we find that workforce performance strongly influences managers' decisions, and this effect is moderated by PMS precision. Under a precise PMS, managers more often choose to reduce hours when workforce performance has been strong, even when low performers are easily identifiable. In contrast, layoffs are more common when workforce performance has been weak. A supplemental experiment supports our theory that managers seek to assign blame by using layoffs only when workforce performance is weak. Under an imprecise PMS, managers rely less on workforce performance information because they cannot easily distinguish among employees. Moreover, we find that employees react differently depending on manager’s decision and the type of PMS. After layoffs, retained employees reciprocate more under an imprecise PMS, consistent with reference-dependent reciprocity theory. However, employee performance after a reduction in hours remains consistent across both precise and imprecise PMS. (Available on SSRN​)
3. “When is it Fairer to Allocate Resources for Training to Lower-Performing versus Higher-Performing Employees?” with Eric Chan and Martin Wiernsperger
Status: Revise & Resubmit at Journal of Accounting Research
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​Presentations: 2024 ERMAC Conference at WU Vienna (Wiernsperger); Cornell University (Wiernsperger); 2024 ABO Conference (Feinberg); 2024 EIASM Conference at Bocconi University (Wiernsperger); 2025 MAS Midyear Meeting (Feinberg); Labor Economics & Accounting Conference at Stanford University (Wiernsperger)
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​​Abstract: Professional development and training are essential for organizational growth and success, but resource constraints often force managers into a dilemma: should they train their lower-performing or higher-performing employees? While lower performers with greater skill gaps can benefit more from training than higher performers, managers must also consider employees’ fairness concerns. Using an interactive experiment, we predict and find that how employees react to their manager’s allocation of training resources depends on the prevailing fairness norms in the work environment. When egalitarian norms dominate, such as when employees have little control over their job tasks, lower performers take the receipt of resources for training for granted and react negatively when the manager allocates those resources to higher performers instead. In contrast, when meritocratic norms dominate, such as when employees have more control over their job tasks, higher performers react more negatively than lower performers to not receiving training resources. Overall, our study highlights the importance for managers to consider both employee productivity and the prevailing fairness norms of the work environment when allocating scarce training resources. (Available on SSRN)
4.“It’s Not All Fun and Games: The Effects of Gamification on Employee Adaptivity” with Eric Chan (based on 2nd year summer paper)
Status: Revise & Resubmit at The Accounting Review
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​Presentations: The University of Texas at Austin (Feinberg); Texas State University (Chan); Brigham Young University (Chan), 2024 ABO Conference (Feinberg); 2025 MAS Midyear Meeting (Feinberg)
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​Recognition: ABO 2024 Emerging Scholar Manuscript Award
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​Abstract: Firms are increasingly using non-monetary gamification (points, badges, levels) to motivate employee performance, but its impact on employee adaptivity is unexplored. This study examines the effects of gamification on employees' 1) performance in an initial task, 2) willingness to switch tasks, and 3) performance in a new task, while considering the moderating effects of employees’ innate challenge-seeking traits. Experimental results show that gamification boosts initial performance by encouraging employees to work longer hours. However, gamification reduces the willingness to switch tasks, particularly for challenge-seeking employees, despite the potential for higher pay. After switching tasks, challenge-seeking employees remain motivated by gamification, but not challenge-avoidant employees. Results from a supplemental experiment support our theory that gamification hurts employee adaptivity due to an increase in task embeddedness. Overall, these findings suggest that, notwithstanding the initial performance benefits, gamification has potential negative effects on employee adaptivity that vary based on individual traits. (Available on SSRN)
Works in Progress
5. “Interpretive Guidance” with Kaitlyn Kroeger
Status: On-going interviews with audit firms and audit committee members​
6. “Mixed Incentives” with Hayden Gunnell
Status: Analyzing field experiment data​